VAP overview
VSO · INCIDENT LIBRARY · 2026-11-22

AI incident library and VAP mapping

This library lists every record on the incident verification records page and maps each one to the questions about evidence that it raised. For each question it sets out what VAP v1.2 makes auditable and attributable, what the current specification does not address, and the related candidate work, none of which has been adopted. It is a reading aid. The verification records remain the authority for what was verified, and nothing here assumes that VAP was in use in any incident.

Verification records · Records (JSON) · Mapping (JSON, CC BY 4.0) · What VAP does not do · Corrections log

How to read this page

What the records show so far

  1. The records almost always existed. In most incidents an operator, a developer or an affected party held logs and used them to reconstruct what happened.
  2. What outsiders could not check recurs: whose record it was (T1: 18 records), whether a review found everything (T2: 7 records), what was in scope and observed (T3: 19 records), whether requests, alerts and remedies took effect (T4: 15 records), and whether a valid credential meant authorisation (T5: 18 records).
  3. In VSO’s reading of these 73 records, none turned on what the core of VAP v1.2 is built to detect: omission or alteration of anchored records by the party holding them, after anchoring (INT-008). Where records were erased, it was the actor erasing records that had not been anchored. The case these records make is therefore for parts that are not yet in the specification.
  4. The number of records is not evidence of need. VSO chose which reports to check, the choice leans towards cases that look relevant to VAP, and many records come from a few disclosing companies.

Evidence questions and VAP v1.2

Clause references are to VAP v1.2.0 Draft 3 (SHA-256 a35d5e08…9998). Candidate rows are in the CHANGE-002 preparation register (candidate work only; nothing adopted).

LabelQuestionRecords
T1Whose record was it?18
T2Did the review find everything?7
T3What was in scope, and what was observed?19
T4Did the request, alert or remedy take effect?15
T5A valid credential is not an authorisation18
T6Code that ran before, or with, the recording point4
T7A published judgement changed later5
T8Secret values in records5
T9No domain profile fits34
T10AI run by the attacker11
T11Was the human step adequate?5
T12Content provenance (subject matter of CAP v1.0)7
T13Boundary case4
  1. T1 · 18 records

    Whose record was it?

    Accounts rested on one party's records — often the acting agent's own — and outsiders could not tell a self-report from an independent observation.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    A tamper-evident record shows that entries were not altered after they were written and anchored (§4.1; INT-004, INT-006), and a signature binds a record to a key (INT-005, §6.1.2). Where parties arrange it in advance, cross-party provenance (XREF, TRC-005) lets corresponding records held by different parties be checked against each other.

    Not in VAP v1.2

    That an entry was true when it was written: a record of a spoofed tool call is kept as faithfully as a true one. v1.2 has no field that distinguishes an actor's own account from a harness observation, a counterparty's record or a record imported from a party that did not take part in XREF.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    F7 Distinguishing evidence origins

    See also: What VAP does not do

    Records

    V1118MUSE V1116CAAG V1106WAYMO V1102NOTION V1024FIREWORKS V1108SNOWBALL V1104BAUDE V1105GRAB V1105 V1030BLACKOCTOBER V1026CAIRN V1021 V1019A V1013 C21 V1007B R16 V0905

  2. T2 · 7 records

    Did the review find everything?

    A developer or operator reviewed its own records and reported what it found. Later disclosures showed that earlier reviews had missed incidents, and no outsider could see which records had been searched.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    For any anchored batch, omission of in-scope events after anchoring, and split-view presentation, are detectable by a verifier holding the anchor (Completeness Invariant, INT-008; §4.1.7) — at anchor time and batch granularity only.

    Not in VAP v1.2

    Which records a retrospective review covered and how it searched them. An event never included in an anchored batch is not revealed by INT-008 alone; it can be shown to be missing only by reference to another record that implies it (§11.1), and an event that was never measured is out of reach (Appendix A, Pre-measurement drop).

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    P2 Declared scope and advance commitment

    See also: What VAP does not do

    Records

    V1116CAAG V1019B V1007A V0927 R16 V0910 R18

  3. T3 · 19 records

    What was in scope, and what was observed?

    What a system or agent could reach, what was being monitored and where logging stopped were stated after the event, if at all.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    INT-008 uses the term “declared scope” and requires each AnchorRecord to bind the event count, the first and last event identifiers and the policy identifier under which the batch was produced (§7.5); a verifier holding the anchor can check those bindings.

    Not in VAP v1.2

    “Declared scope” is not defined, and nothing requires it to be committed before the events it covers. There is no way to mark a resource declared reachable but not instrumented, or to record a change in monitoring conditions as such.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    P2 Declared scope and advance commitment

    Records

    V1118MUSE V1110BARRACUDA V1105WEILLCORNELL V1102NOTION V1024FIREWORKS V1020RAILWAY V1106WORKOS V1105AEPD V1105 V1023PANASONIC V1028DARTMOUTH V0921BAYVIEW V1021 V1019A V0914 C21 R16 V0905 R18

  4. T4 · 15 records

    Did the request, alert or remedy take effect?

    Deletion requests, alerts, key rotations, recalls and stop orders were reported as sent or done. Whether the other side received them, and whether an effect was observed, were separate facts that the accounts ran together.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    Recorded actions and their outcome status (§4.2.2) are tamper-evident once anchored, and their omission after anchoring is detectable (INT-008). Where a profile or capability requires a recorded request or attempt to terminate in a recorded outcome, a missing outcome can be shown against that requirement (§11.1).

    Not in VAP v1.2

    v1.2 has no common rule that requests, alerts or recommendations close with a terminating event, and does not separate a request, its receipt, the other party's claim and an observed effect. The passage of time, or a reply, is not an observation of effect.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    F8 Resolution invariant

    Records

    V1111WAYMOFREEWAY V1116EXPLOITAGENT V1116CAAG V1105WEILLCORNELL V1106WAYMO V1104BAUDE V1104CHAINALYSIS V1102SCHOOL V1105WAN V1105 V1023PANASONIC V0921BAYVIEW V1021 V1007A R07

  5. T5 · 18 records

    A valid credential is not an authorisation

    Genuine identifiers, valid keys and accepted credentials were used for actions their holders did not authorise, or an approved action differed from the one carried out.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    A signature binds a record to a key (INT-005, §6.1.2). The Accountability Layer records the operator, the last approval and a delegation chain with scope and validity period (§4.4.3).

    Not in VAP v1.2

    “Attributable” is not defined beyond verification under a supplied key. A valid signature or credential does not show that the operation was authorised, who or what controlled the key, or that what was executed matched what was approved, and v1.2 does not ask an assessment to report these questions separately.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    F9 Evaluation dimensions · F11 Meaning of attributable

    Records

    V1117AGENTFRAMEWORK V1110BARRACUDA V1109CUBIST V1020RAILWAY V1104CHAINALYSIS V1106WORKOS V1103RAILWAY V1105AZURE V1104CRAFTY V1105 V1030BLACKOCTOBER V1027USBANKS V1029DODAGENT V1029CURSOR V1026CAIRN V1025 V0914 R08

  6. T6 · 4 records

    Code that ran before, or with, the recording point

    Malicious code ran before any logging point inside the affected component, or with the same privileges as its records and keys, so the compromised party's own records and signatures could not separate genuine activity from the attacker's.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    Records anchored before a compromise can still be checked against their anchors (INT-006), so a later alteration of them is detectable.

    Not in VAP v1.2

    v1.2 defines no time-stamped declaration that a signing key was compromised, and does not require recording keys and anchoring credentials to sit outside the trust boundary of the actor being recorded.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    F12 Key-compromise declarations

    Records

    V1117AGENTFRAMEWORK V1105 V1029CURSOR V1026CAIRN

  7. T7 · 5 records

    A published judgement changed later

    An organisation's dated assessment — of scope, exposure, attribution or classification — was later revised, and readers had to work out which statement replaced which.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    Anchored records are tamper-evident, so a dated statement that was recorded and anchored cannot be rewritten later without detection. Overrides of an action are recorded in override_history (§4.4.3).

    Not in VAP v1.2

    There is no type that links a later judgement to the earlier one it replaces, keeps it distinct from the original, and separates a recorded replacement from evidence that the replacement was carried out.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    F14 Replacement of a decision

    Records

    V1104CHAINALYSIS V1105AZURE R10 V0919 R17

  8. T8 · 5 records

    Secret values in records

    Passwords, tokens and API keys ended up in logs, build histories, task records or shared evidence, so the records themselves became a path of exposure.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    ERASURE records crypto-shredding of protected fields that the implementation itself encrypted, leaving hashes and anchors verifiable (§6.3, §7.4).

    Not in VAP v1.2

    No rule keeps reusable secrets out of signed or anchored records. Once anchored, a plaintext secret cannot be withdrawn, and crypto-shredding covers only what was encrypted before it went in.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    F13 Secret values in evidence

    Records

    V1020RAILWAY V1104CHAINALYSIS V1106WORKOS V1105AZURE V1026CAIRN

  9. T9 · 34 records

    No domain profile fits

    The deployment — an evaluation environment, a general-purpose assistant or coding agent, a consumer agent, an employment or moderation system, a vehicle — falls outside every registered domain profile.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    A deployment invokes capabilities alongside exactly one domain profile (§4.6.3, rule 1). The profile registry lists VCP (finance), CAP (content) and CPP (capture) as released, and OAP, MAP and PAP as drafts (§4.5.2).

    Not in VAP v1.2

    A conformance route for a deployment that no registered profile covers. VAP is not a general-purpose logging framework (§1.3); a design inference in such a record is not a conformance claim.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    F10 Deployments without a domain profile

    See also: What VAP does not do

    Records

    V1120LINGLE V1117BELLCANADA V1111WAYMOFREEWAY V1119EUCOMMISSION V1118MUSE V1116CAAG V1109CUBIST V1106WAYMO V1109KINOSAKI V1104BAUDE V1105GRAB V1102SCHOOL V1105WAN V1021 V1019B V1019A V1007A V0927 R15 R10 R08 R07 R06 C27 C21 V1007B V0919 R16 V0910 V0905 R18 R19 R13 R01

  10. T10 · 11 records

    AI run by the attacker

    The AI system at issue was the attacker's own, or one the attacker used; what is known comes from the attacker's exposed records or from defenders' observations.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    What VAP can bear on afterwards is the record a targeted organisation keeps on its own systems, where that organisation implements VAP.

    Not in VAP v1.2

    VAP places no obligation on anyone who does not implement it. It cannot require an attacker to keep or disclose records, and it does not determine whether AI was used in an attack or who the attacker was. This is a statement of scope, not a gap to close.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    None. This is outside VAP by design.

    See also: What VAP does not do

    Records

    V1117BELLCANADA V1119EUCOMMISSION V1116EXPLOITAGENT V1108SNOWBALL V1106STORM3358 V1105AZURE V1104CRAFTY V1105AEPD V1031VOLTA V1025 V1013

  11. T11 · 5 records

    Was the human step adequate?

    The failure lay in people and procedure: an output nobody checked, a review that stopped at the edge of an institution's records, or human involvement whose adequacy is a legal question.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    A recorded step, including a human review where the deployment records one, can be made attributable (§4.4.3: operator_id, last_approval_by; §4.4.4).

    Not in VAP v1.2

    Whether a review was adequate, a policy sound or a response timely. VAP does not itself provide monitoring, intervention or override capability (§4.4.4), and does not warrant the correctness, fairness or safety of the decisions recorded (§1.6(c)).

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    None. This is outside VAP by design.

    See also: What VAP does not do

    Records

    V1120LINGLE V1028DARTMOUTH C27 R20 R02

  12. T12 · 7 records

    Content provenance (subject matter of CAP v1.0)

    The dispute concerns where generated or published content came from, which sources were used, or what a generation service did with a request — the subject matter of the released content profile.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    CAP v1.0 is a released profile (§4.5.2). Each record names the clause it relies on, for example CAP's Safe Refusal Provenance for generation requests and refusals.

    Not in VAP v1.2

    Falling within a profile's subject matter does not mean that anyone implemented it; VSO knows of no party in these records that implements CAP. Several records are only adjacent to CAP's scope, and each says so.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    None.

    Records

    C23 R20 R17 R11 R09 R03 R02

  13. T13 · 4 records

    Boundary case

    Listed to mark the edge of VAP's relevance: the dispute turns on disclosure, alleged collusion, misappropriation by people or controlled research results, not on AI decision records.

    What VAP v1.2 makes auditable

    Little or nothing in substance; each record says so.

    Not in VAP v1.2

    VAP does not decide securities, competition or trade-secret questions, or whether research results carry over to deployment.

    Related candidate work (unadopted)

    None.

    Records

    C24 R14 R05 R04

Library (73)

Litigation and enforcement filings (allegations untested) (15)

Agents under evaluation or research that reached real systems (12)

Security of AI development platforms and credential paths (14)

AI used by attackers (11)

Agents acting for users (2)

Professional and institutional use of AI (6)

AI in the physical world (5)

Decisions about people (3)

Personal data entered into AI tools (3)

Other (2)

Not listed, as on the verification records page: on hold (4), not recorded as new incidents (no new primary facts) (5), awaiting re-verification (3), registration undecided (1).

Method and interests

This classification was prepared by VSO with AI assistance, using Anthropic’s Claude. Anthropic is a party to, or its models are central in, 13 of these records (V1109CUBIST, V1104BAUDE, V1031VOLTA, V1029DODAGENT, V1029CURSOR, V1028DARTMOUTH, V1025, V1013, C21, V0910, R18, C24, R09). The classification has not been reviewed by anyone outside VSO. VSO develops VAP and has an interest in how these incidents are read; that is why each question states what the current specification does not address.

VAP v1.2 §1.6 (verbatim)

VAP and its domain profiles define mechanisms for producing cryptographically verifiable evidence of AI system decisions. Conformance to VAP or any profile: (a) does not constitute compliance with the EU AI Act, GDPR, MiFID II/III, CAT Rule 613, NIS2, FDA SaMD guidance, or any other law or regulation; (b) does not constitute a legal determination that any technical mechanism (including crypto-shredding) satisfies a specific legal obligation; (c) does not warrant the correctness, fairness, or safety of the underlying AI decisions — only the integrity, completeness (at anchor granularity), and attributability of their records. VAP generates evidence; competent authorities and courts evaluate it.

Implementation status

As of 25 October 2026: zero external implementations of VAP or any VAP profile, and zero Evidence Packs accepted in any proceeding. The previously published paid-service contract figure was withdrawn on 24 October 2026 pending reconciliation with primary records; this does not establish a count of zero.

Dated correction · Corrections log