{
  "updated": "2026-11-22",
  "license": "CC BY 4.0",
  "about": {
    "en": "VSO's editorial classification of the records in incidents.json. Areas and question labels (T1–T13) are navigation aids, not registry fields, ledger entries or specification identifiers. Every record in incidents.json must have an entry here; the page build fails otherwise.",
    "ja": "incidents.json の記録についての VSO の編集上の分類です。区分と問いのラベル（T1〜T13）は案内のためのもので、レジストリの欄、台帳の登録、仕様の識別子ではありません。incidents.json のすべての記録にここでの対応が必要で、欠けるとページの生成が失敗します。"
  },
  "spec": {
    "label": "VAP v1.2.0 Draft 3",
    "url": "https://github.com/veritaschain/vap-spec/blob/1ce71a66f55d9a20728213b7c3a8bb79270ae579/spec/v1.2/VAP_Framework_Specification.md",
    "sha256": "a35d5e082fd4b2f9921a78b1a71df263018320375e09fa18cf81533a18a19998"
  },
  "register": {
    "label": {
      "en": "CHANGE-002 preparation register (candidate work only; nothing adopted)",
      "ja": "CHANGE-002 準備用登録簿（候補作業のみ・採択されたものはない）"
    },
    "url": "https://github.com/veritaschain/vap-spec/blob/6314e04b9222bb7546188eb8ca77e43494a117fa/proposals/CHANGE-002-CANDIDATES.md"
  },
  "candidates": {
    "P2": {"anchor": "2-ten-current-proposal-directories", "en": "P2 Declared scope and advance commitment", "ja": "P2 宣言スコープと事前コミット"},
    "F7": {"anchor": "f7-distinguishing-evidence-origins-出所の区別", "en": "F7 Distinguishing evidence origins", "ja": "F7 記録の出所の区別"},
    "F8": {"anchor": "f8-resolution-invariant-解決不変量", "en": "F8 Resolution invariant", "ja": "F8 解決不変量"},
    "F9": {"anchor": "f9-evaluation-dimensions-評価次元", "en": "F9 Evaluation dimensions", "ja": "F9 評価の次元"},
    "F10": {"anchor": "f10-deployments-without-a-domain-profile-プロファイルなしの配備", "en": "F10 Deployments without a domain profile", "ja": "F10 領域プロファイルを持たない配備"},
    "F11": {"anchor": "f11-meaning-of-attributable-attributable", "en": "F11 Meaning of attributable", "ja": "F11 attributable の意味"},
    "F12": {"anchor": "f12-key-compromise-declarations-鍵侵害宣言", "en": "F12 Key-compromise declarations", "ja": "F12 鍵侵害の宣言"},
    "F13": {"anchor": "f13-secret-values-in-evidence-秘密値", "en": "F13 Secret values in evidence", "ja": "F13 証跡中の秘密値"},
    "F14": {"anchor": "f14-replacement-of-a-decision-判断の置き換え", "en": "F14 Replacement of a decision", "ja": "F14 判断の置き換え"}
  },
  "areas": [
    {"id": "litigation", "en": "Litigation and enforcement filings (allegations untested)", "ja": "訴訟・執行の申立て（主張は未検証）"},
    {"id": "evaluation", "en": "Agents under evaluation or research that reached real systems", "ja": "評価・研究中のエージェントによる実システムへの到達"},
    {"id": "platform", "en": "Security of AI development platforms and credential paths", "ja": "AI 開発基盤と資格情報経路のセキュリティ"},
    {"id": "attacker", "en": "AI used by attackers", "ja": "攻撃者による AI の利用"},
    {"id": "user-agents", "en": "Agents acting for users", "ja": "利用者の代わりに動くエージェント"},
    {"id": "professional", "en": "Professional and institutional use of AI", "ja": "専門職・組織による AI の不適切な利用"},
    {"id": "physical", "en": "AI in the physical world", "ja": "物理世界の AI"},
    {"id": "people", "en": "Decisions about people", "ja": "人に関する判断"},
    {"id": "data-input", "en": "Personal data entered into AI tools", "ja": "個人データの AI ツールへの入力"},
    {"id": "other", "en": "Other", "ja": "その他"}
  ],
  "questions": [
    {
      "id": "T1",
      "slug": "t1-whose-record",
      "label": {"en": "Whose record was it?", "ja": "誰の記録だったか"},
      "question": {
        "en": "Accounts rested on one party's records — often the acting agent's own — and outsiders could not tell a self-report from an independent observation.",
        "ja": "説明は一方の当事者の記録（多くは行為したエージェント自身の記録）に依っており、外部からは自己申告と独立の観測を見分けられなかった。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "A tamper-evident record shows that entries were not altered after they were written and anchored (§4.1; INT-004, INT-006), and a signature binds a record to a key (INT-005, §6.1.2). Where parties arrange it in advance, cross-party provenance (XREF, TRC-005) lets corresponding records held by different parties be checked against each other.",
        "ja": "改ざん検知可能（tamper-evident）な記録は、書かれてアンカーされた後に記載が変わっていないことを示します（§4.1、INT-004、INT-006）。署名は記録を鍵に結び付けます（INT-005、§6.1.2）。当事者が事前に取り決めた場合は、クロスパーティ・プロビナンス（XREF、TRC-005）により、別々の当事者が持つ対応する記録を突き合わせられます。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "That an entry was true when it was written: a record of a spoofed tool call is kept as faithfully as a true one. v1.2 has no field that distinguishes an actor's own account from a harness observation, a counterparty's record or a record imported from a party that did not take part in XREF.",
        "ja": "書かれた時点で記載が正しかったこと。偽装されたツール呼び出しの記録も、正しい記録と同じように残ります。v1.2 には、行為者自身の記載、ハーネスの観測、相手方の記録、XREF に参加していない当事者から取り込んだ記録を区別する欄がありません。"
      },
      "candidates": ["F7"],
      "limits": "wrong-when-written"
    },
    {
      "id": "T2",
      "slug": "t2-found-everything",
      "label": {"en": "Did the review find everything?", "ja": "見つかったものが全部か"},
      "question": {
        "en": "A developer or operator reviewed its own records and reported what it found. Later disclosures showed that earlier reviews had missed incidents, and no outsider could see which records had been searched.",
        "ja": "開発者や運営者が自らの記録を見直して結果を公表したが、後の開示で先の見直しの見落としが判明した例があり、外部からはどの記録を探したのかが見えなかった。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "For any anchored batch, omission of in-scope events after anchoring, and split-view presentation, are detectable by a verifier holding the anchor (Completeness Invariant, INT-008; §4.1.7) — at anchor time and batch granularity only.",
        "ja": "アンカー済みの各バッチについて、アンカー後の対象イベントの省略と split-view の提示は、アンカーを持つ検証者が検出できます（Completeness Invariant、INT-008、§4.1.7）。ただしアンカー時点・バッチ粒度に限られます。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "Which records a retrospective review covered and how it searched them. An event never included in an anchored batch is not revealed by INT-008 alone; it can be shown to be missing only by reference to another record that implies it (§11.1), and an event that was never measured is out of reach (Appendix A, Pre-measurement drop).",
        "ja": "遡及的な見直しがどの記録を対象にし、どう探したか。一度もアンカー済みバッチに入らなかったイベントは INT-008 だけでは明らかにならず、その存在を含意する別の記録との照合でのみ欠落を示せます（§11.1）。計測されなかったイベントは射程の外です（Appendix A、Pre-measurement drop）。"
      },
      "candidates": ["P2"],
      "limits": "never-measured"
    },
    {
      "id": "T3",
      "slug": "t3-scope",
      "label": {"en": "What was in scope, and what was observed?", "ja": "何が対象で、どこを観測していたか"},
      "question": {
        "en": "What a system or agent could reach, what was being monitored and where logging stopped were stated after the event, if at all.",
        "ja": "システムやエージェントが何に到達でき、何を監視し、どこで記録が途切れていたかは、事後に述べられるか、述べられないままだった。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "INT-008 uses the term “declared scope” and requires each AnchorRecord to bind the event count, the first and last event identifiers and the policy identifier under which the batch was produced (§7.5); a verifier holding the anchor can check those bindings.",
        "ja": "INT-008 は「declared scope」という語を用い、各 AnchorRecord に、イベント数、最初と最後のイベント識別子、バッチ作成時のポリシー識別子を束縛するよう求めます（§7.5）。アンカーを持つ検証者はこれらの束縛を確かめられます。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "“Declared scope” is not defined, and nothing requires it to be committed before the events it covers. There is no way to mark a resource declared reachable but not instrumented, or to record a change in monitoring conditions as such.",
        "ja": "「declared scope」は定義されておらず、対象のイベントより前にコミットする要件もありません。到達可能としながら計測点のない資源を明示する手段も、監視条件の変更をそれとして記録する手段もありません。"
      },
      "candidates": ["P2"],
      "limits": null
    },
    {
      "id": "T4",
      "slug": "t4-effect",
      "label": {"en": "Did the request, alert or remedy take effect?", "ja": "要求・警報・是正は効いたか"},
      "question": {
        "en": "Deletion requests, alerts, key rotations, recalls and stop orders were reported as sent or done. Whether the other side received them, and whether an effect was observed, were separate facts that the accounts ran together.",
        "ja": "削除の依頼、警報、鍵の更新、リコール、停止措置は「送った」「実施した」と報告されたが、相手が受け取ったか、効果が観測されたかは別の事実で、説明の中では混ざっていた。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "Recorded actions and their outcome status (§4.2.2) are tamper-evident once anchored, and their omission after anchoring is detectable (INT-008). Where a profile or capability requires a recorded request or attempt to terminate in a recorded outcome, a missing outcome can be shown against that requirement (§11.1).",
        "ja": "記録された行為とその結果の状態（§4.2.2）は、アンカー後は改ざん検知可能で、アンカー後の省略も検出できます（INT-008）。プロファイルや capability が、記録された要求・試行を記録された結果で終端させるよう求めている場合は、結果の欠落をその要件に照らして示せます（§11.1）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "v1.2 has no common rule that requests, alerts or recommendations close with a terminating event, and does not separate a request, its receipt, the other party's claim and an observed effect. The passage of time, or a reply, is not an observation of effect.",
        "ja": "要求・警報・勧告が終端イベントで閉じるという共通の規則も、要求、相手の受領、相手の主張、観測された効果を分ける規定もありません。時間の経過や返答は、効果の観測ではありません。"
      },
      "candidates": ["F8"],
      "limits": null
    },
    {
      "id": "T5",
      "slug": "t5-authorisation",
      "label": {"en": "A valid credential is not an authorisation", "ja": "有効な資格情報は認可ではない"},
      "question": {
        "en": "Genuine identifiers, valid keys and accepted credentials were used for actions their holders did not authorise, or an approved action differed from the one carried out.",
        "ja": "本物の識別子、有効な鍵、受理された資格情報が、保有者の認可していない操作に使われた。あるいは、承認された内容と実行された内容が食い違った。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "A signature binds a record to a key (INT-005, §6.1.2). The Accountability Layer records the operator, the last approval and a delegation chain with scope and validity period (§4.4.3).",
        "ja": "署名は記録を鍵に結び付けます（INT-005、§6.1.2）。Accountability Layer は、運営者、最後の承認、範囲と有効期間を持つ委任の連鎖を記録します（§4.4.3）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "“Attributable” is not defined beyond verification under a supplied key. A valid signature or credential does not show that the operation was authorised, who or what controlled the key, or that what was executed matched what was approved, and v1.2 does not ask an assessment to report these questions separately.",
        "ja": "「attributable」は、提示された鍵での検証を超えては定義されていません。有効な署名や資格情報は、その操作が認可されていたこと、鍵を誰が・何が制御していたか、実行内容が承認内容と一致したことを示しません。v1.2 は、評価においてこれらの問いを分けて報告することを求めていません。"
      },
      "candidates": ["F9", "F11"],
      "limits": null
    },
    {
      "id": "T6",
      "slug": "t6-recording-point",
      "label": {"en": "Code that ran before, or with, the recording point", "ja": "記録点より先に、または同じ権限で動いたコード"},
      "question": {
        "en": "Malicious code ran before any logging point inside the affected component, or with the same privileges as its records and keys, so the compromised party's own records and signatures could not separate genuine activity from the attacker's.",
        "ja": "悪意のあるコードが、影響を受けた部品の内部の記録点より先に、あるいはその記録や鍵と同じ権限で動いたため、侵害された側の記録と署名だけでは、正規の活動と攻撃者の活動を分けられなかった。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "Records anchored before a compromise can still be checked against their anchors (INT-006), so a later alteration of them is detectable.",
        "ja": "侵害の前にアンカーされた記録は、そのアンカーと照合できます（INT-006）。それらを後から変えれば検出できます。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "v1.2 defines no time-stamped declaration that a signing key was compromised, and does not require recording keys and anchoring credentials to sit outside the trust boundary of the actor being recorded.",
        "ja": "v1.2 には、署名鍵の侵害を時刻つきで宣言する仕組みがなく、記録の署名鍵やアンカーの資格情報を、記録される行為者とは別の信頼境界に置くことも求めていません。"
      },
      "candidates": ["F12"],
      "limits": null
    },
    {
      "id": "T7",
      "slug": "t7-changed-judgement",
      "label": {"en": "A published judgement changed later", "ja": "公表された判断が後で変わった"},
      "question": {
        "en": "An organisation's dated assessment — of scope, exposure, attribution or classification — was later revised, and readers had to work out which statement replaced which.",
        "ja": "組織が日付つきで示した評価（範囲、露出、帰属、分類）が後に改められ、読み手はどの説明がどれを置き換えたのかを自ら組み立て直す必要があった。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "Anchored records are tamper-evident, so a dated statement that was recorded and anchored cannot be rewritten later without detection. Overrides of an action are recorded in override_history (§4.4.3).",
        "ja": "アンカー済みの記録は改ざん検知可能なので、記録・アンカーされた日付つきの判断を、後から検出されずに書き換えることはできません。行為の上書きは override_history に記録されます（§4.4.3）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "There is no type that links a later judgement to the earlier one it replaces, keeps it distinct from the original, and separates a recorded replacement from evidence that the replacement was carried out.",
        "ja": "後の判断を、それが置き換える先の判断に結び付け、元の判断と区別し、記録された置き換えとそれが実行された証拠とを分ける型がありません。"
      },
      "candidates": ["F14"],
      "limits": null
    },
    {
      "id": "T8",
      "slug": "t8-secrets",
      "label": {"en": "Secret values in records", "ja": "記録に入った秘密値"},
      "question": {
        "en": "Passwords, tokens and API keys ended up in logs, build histories, task records or shared evidence, so the records themselves became a path of exposure.",
        "ja": "パスワード、トークン、API キーがログ、ビルド履歴、タスク記録、共有用の証跡に入り込み、記録そのものが露出の経路になった。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "ERASURE records crypto-shredding of protected fields that the implementation itself encrypted, leaving hashes and anchors verifiable (§6.3, §7.4).",
        "ja": "ERASURE は、実装自身が暗号化した保護対象フィールドの crypto-shredding を記録し、ハッシュとアンカーは検証可能なまま残します（§6.3、§7.4）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "No rule keeps reusable secrets out of signed or anchored records. Once anchored, a plaintext secret cannot be withdrawn, and crypto-shredding covers only what was encrypted before it went in.",
        "ja": "再利用可能な秘密値を署名・アンカー対象の記録に入れないという規定がありません。平文の秘密値はアンカー後に取り消せず、crypto-shredding が及ぶのは入れる前に暗号化したものだけです。"
      },
      "candidates": ["F13"],
      "limits": null
    },
    {
      "id": "T9",
      "slug": "t9-no-profile",
      "label": {"en": "No domain profile fits", "ja": "合う領域プロファイルがない"},
      "question": {
        "en": "The deployment — an evaluation environment, a general-purpose assistant or coding agent, a consumer agent, an employment or moderation system, a vehicle — falls outside every registered domain profile.",
        "ja": "配備（評価環境、汎用の対話アシスタントやコーディングエージェント、個人向けエージェント、雇用やモデレーションのシステム、車両）が、登録済みのどの領域プロファイルにも入らない。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "A deployment invokes capabilities alongside exactly one domain profile (§4.6.3, rule 1). The profile registry lists VCP (finance), CAP (content) and CPP (capture) as released, and OAP, MAP and PAP as drafts (§4.5.2).",
        "ja": "配備は、ちょうど 1 つの領域プロファイルとともに capability を呼び出します（§4.6.3 規則 1）。プロファイル登録簿でリリース済みなのは VCP（金融）、CAP（コンテンツ）、CPP（キャプチャ）で、OAP、MAP、PAP は草案です（§4.5.2）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "A conformance route for a deployment that no registered profile covers. VAP is not a general-purpose logging framework (§1.3); a design inference in such a record is not a conformance claim.",
        "ja": "登録済みのどのプロファイルにも入らない配備の適合経路。VAP は汎用のログ基盤ではありません（§1.3）。そうした記録で示す設計上の推論は、適合の主張ではありません。"
      },
      "candidates": ["F10"],
      "limits": "outside-scope"
    },
    {
      "id": "T10",
      "slug": "t10-attacker-run",
      "label": {"en": "AI run by the attacker", "ja": "攻撃者が自ら動かす AI"},
      "question": {
        "en": "The AI system at issue was the attacker's own, or one the attacker used; what is known comes from the attacker's exposed records or from defenders' observations.",
        "ja": "問題の AI システムは攻撃者自身のもの、または攻撃者が使ったもので、分かっていることは攻撃者側の露出した記録か、防御側の観測に由来する。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "What VAP can bear on afterwards is the record a targeted organisation keeps on its own systems, where that organisation implements VAP.",
        "ja": "VAP が事後に関われるのは、標的となった組織が自らのシステムで作る記録です（その組織が VAP を実装している場合）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "VAP places no obligation on anyone who does not implement it. It cannot require an attacker to keep or disclose records, and it does not determine whether AI was used in an attack or who the attacker was. This is a statement of scope, not a gap to close.",
        "ja": "VAP は、実装していない者に何の義務も課しません。攻撃者に記録の保持や開示を求めることも、攻撃に AI が使われたか、攻撃者が誰かを判定することもできません。これは射程の宣言であり、埋めるべき欠落ではありません。"
      },
      "candidates": [],
      "limits": "attacker-run"
    },
    {
      "id": "T11",
      "slug": "t11-human-step",
      "label": {"en": "Was the human step adequate?", "ja": "人の確認は十分だったか"},
      "question": {
        "en": "The failure lay in people and procedure: an output nobody checked, a review that stopped at the edge of an institution's records, or human involvement whose adequacy is a legal question.",
        "ja": "失敗は人と手続にあった。誰も確認しなかった出力、組織の記録の端で止まった調査、適否が法的な問題となる人の関与など。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "A recorded step, including a human review where the deployment records one, can be made attributable (§4.4.3: operator_id, last_approval_by; §4.4.4).",
        "ja": "記録された手順は、配備が人による確認を記録していればそれも含めて、帰属可能にできます（§4.4.3 の operator_id、last_approval_by、§4.4.4）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "Whether a review was adequate, a policy sound or a response timely. VAP does not itself provide monitoring, intervention or override capability (§4.4.4), and does not warrant the correctness, fairness or safety of the decisions recorded (§1.6(c)).",
        "ja": "確認が十分だったか、方針が妥当だったか、対応が適時だったか。VAP 自体は監視・介入・上書きの機能を持たず（§4.4.4）、記録された判断の正しさ・公正さ・安全性について何も述べません（§1.6(c)）。"
      },
      "candidates": [],
      "limits": "people-procedure"
    },
    {
      "id": "T12",
      "slug": "t12-content-provenance",
      "label": {"en": "Content provenance (subject matter of CAP v1.0)", "ja": "コンテンツの来歴（CAP v1.0 の対象領域）"},
      "question": {
        "en": "The dispute concerns where generated or published content came from, which sources were used, or what a generation service did with a request — the subject matter of the released content profile.",
        "ja": "争点が、生成・公表されたコンテンツの出所、使われた情報源、生成サービスが要求をどう扱ったかにあり、リリース済みのコンテンツ・プロファイルの対象領域にあたる。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "CAP v1.0 is a released profile (§4.5.2). Each record names the clause it relies on, for example CAP's Safe Refusal Provenance for generation requests and refusals.",
        "ja": "CAP v1.0 はリリース済みのプロファイルです（§4.5.2）。各記録に、依拠する条項を示しています（例：生成要求と拒否についての CAP の Safe Refusal Provenance）。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "Falling within a profile's subject matter does not mean that anyone implemented it; VSO knows of no party in these records that implements CAP. Several records are only adjacent to CAP's scope, and each says so.",
        "ja": "プロファイルの対象領域にあたることは、誰かが実装していたことを意味しません。これらの記録の当事者で CAP を実装している者を VSO は把握していません。CAP の範囲に隣接するだけの記録もあり、各記録にその旨を示しています。"
      },
      "candidates": [],
      "limits": null
    },
    {
      "id": "T13",
      "slug": "t13-boundary",
      "label": {"en": "Boundary case", "ja": "境界事例"},
      "question": {
        "en": "Listed to mark the edge of VAP's relevance: the dispute turns on disclosure, alleged collusion, misappropriation by people or controlled research results, not on AI decision records.",
        "ja": "VAP との関係の端を示すために掲載したもの。争点は開示、共謀の主張、人による不正取得、管理された研究結果などで、AI の判断記録ではない。"
      },
      "v12": {
        "en": "Little or nothing in substance; each record says so.",
        "ja": "実質的にはほとんど、またはまったくありません。各記録にその旨を示しています。"
      },
      "not_v12": {
        "en": "VAP does not decide securities, competition or trade-secret questions, or whether research results carry over to deployment.",
        "ja": "VAP は、証券、競争法、営業秘密の問題や、研究結果が実際の配備に当てはまるかを判断しません。"
      },
      "candidates": [],
      "limits": null
    }
  ],
  "records": {
    "R01": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T9"]},
    "R03": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T12"]},
    "R04": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T13"]},
    "R05": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T13"]},
    "R07": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T4", "T9"]},
    "R09": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T12"]},
    "R10": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T7", "T9"]},
    "R11": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T12"]},
    "R13": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T9"]},
    "R14": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T13"]},
    "R15": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T9"]},
    "V1105WAN": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T4", "T9"]},
    "V1102SCHOOL": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T4", "T9"]},
    "V1109CUBIST": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T5", "T9"]},
    "V1116CAAG": {"area": "litigation", "questions": ["T1", "T2", "T4", "T9"]},

    "R16": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T1", "T2", "T3", "T9"]},
    "R18": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T2", "T3", "T9"]},
    "C21": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T1", "T3", "T9"]},
    "V0905": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T1", "T3", "T9"]},
    "V0910": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T2", "T9"]},
    "V0919": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T7", "T9"]},
    "V0927": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T2", "T9"]},
    "V1007A": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T2", "T4", "T9"]},
    "V1007B": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T1", "T9"]},
    "V1019A": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T1", "T3", "T9"]},
    "V1019B": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T2", "T9"]},
    "V1021": {"area": "evaluation", "questions": ["T1", "T3", "T4", "T9"]},

    "V1030BLACKOCTOBER": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T1", "T5"]},
    "V1020RAILWAY": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T3", "T5", "T8"]},
    "V1024FIREWORKS": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T1", "T3"]},
    "V1102NOTION": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T1", "T3"]},
    "V1104CHAINALYSIS": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T4", "T5", "T7", "T8"]},
    "V1106WORKOS": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T3", "T5", "T8"]},
    "V1029CURSOR": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T5", "T6"]},
    "V1105": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T1", "T3", "T4", "T5", "T6"]},
    "V1026CAIRN": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T1", "T5", "T6", "T8"]},
    "V1027USBANKS": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T5"]},
    "V1029DODAGENT": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T5"]},
    "V1103RAILWAY": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T5"]},
    "V1110BARRACUDA": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T3", "T5"]},
    "V1117AGENTFRAMEWORK": {"area": "platform", "questions": ["T5", "T6"]},

    "V1013": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T1", "T10"]},
    "V1025": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T5", "T10"]},
    "V1106STORM3358": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T10"]},
    "V1108SNOWBALL": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T1", "T10"]},
    "V1031VOLTA": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T10"]},
    "V1104CRAFTY": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T5", "T10"]},
    "V1105AEPD": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T3", "T10"]},
    "V1105AZURE": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T5", "T7", "T8", "T10"]},
    "V1116EXPLOITAGENT": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T4", "T10"]},
    "V1119EUCOMMISSION": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T9", "T10"]},
    "V1117BELLCANADA": {"area": "attacker", "questions": ["T9", "T10"]},

    "V1104BAUDE": {"area": "user-agents", "questions": ["T1", "T4", "T9"]},
    "V1118MUSE": {"area": "user-agents", "questions": ["T1", "T3", "T9"]},

    "R02": {"area": "professional", "questions": ["T11", "T12"]},
    "R17": {"area": "professional", "questions": ["T7", "T12"]},
    "R20": {"area": "professional", "questions": ["T11", "T12"]},
    "C23": {"area": "professional", "questions": ["T12"]},
    "V1028DARTMOUTH": {"area": "professional", "questions": ["T3", "T11"]},
    "V1120LINGLE": {"area": "professional", "questions": ["T9", "T11"]},

    "V1105GRAB": {"area": "physical", "questions": ["T1", "T9"]},
    "V1106WAYMO": {"area": "physical", "questions": ["T1", "T4", "T9"]},
    "V1109KINOSAKI": {"area": "physical", "questions": ["T9"]},
    "V1111WAYMOFREEWAY": {"area": "physical", "questions": ["T4", "T9"]},
    "R19": {"area": "physical", "questions": ["T9"]},

    "C27": {"area": "people", "questions": ["T9", "T11"]},
    "R08": {"area": "people", "questions": ["T5", "T9"]},
    "V0914": {"area": "people", "questions": ["T3", "T5"]},

    "V1105WEILLCORNELL": {"area": "data-input", "questions": ["T3", "T4"]},
    "V0921BAYVIEW": {"area": "data-input", "questions": ["T3", "T4"]},
    "V1023PANASONIC": {"area": "data-input", "questions": ["T3", "T4"]},

    "R06": {"area": "other", "questions": ["T9"]},
    "C24": {"area": "other", "questions": ["T13"]}
  }
}
