VSO announcements

VSO · · RELEASE

VeraSnap Verify SDK 0.1.0: open-source server-side checks for CPP capture proofs

On 18 November 2026, VeritasChain Co., Ltd., which operates VSO, published VeraSnap Verify SDK 0.1.0 on GitHub under the Apache License 2.0. It lets an organisation that receives photos as evidence check, on its own servers, whether a photo carries a valid VeraSnap capture proof and whether that proof was signed by a device key the organisation enrolled. Its first intended users are non-life insurers handling claim photos.

1. What was released

The repository contains a Python package (Python 3.10 or later), a command-line tool, and documentation in English and Japanese. Verification needs no network access. It accepts the three formats written by the VeraSnap apps: the shareable proof JSON, the internal proof.json, and the Evidence Pack ZIP.

Checks performed for each proof
CheckWhat it establishes
Media hash and ES256 signatureThe file matches the event signed on the device.
RFC 3161 timestampThe token was issued for this proof’s anchored digest. The CMS signature, ESSCertID, extended key usage and the certificate chain at genTime are validated against bundled roots. Only a verified time is reported.
Device-key enrollmentAndroid Key Attestation and Apple App Attest are checked when a key is enrolled. Only keys that the receiving organisation enrolled can give a green result.
Capture time against timestampMore than 60 minutes between the recorded capture time and the timestamp gives a warning, the same rule as the VeraSnap 1.6.1 apps. The capture time itself is the device clock’s value.
Merkle inclusionThe event is included in the anchored batch. Deletion counts in the chain context are not signed and are reported as a hint.

Each result is green (ANCHOR_VERIFIED), yellow (PARTIALLY_VERIFIED, ANCHOR_PENDING) or red (SIGNATURE_INVALID, HASH_MISMATCH, ERROR), with every check listed under a stable code.

2. Context: after-the-fact checks of claim photos

Public reports

In 2026, Japanese non-life insurers began analysing submitted images after the fact for traces of generative AI and for re-use. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance / Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance · 2026-08-03 (PDF, Japanese) · Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance · 2026-09-30 (PDF, Japanese)

3. Fraud scenarios and results

  • Editing or AI inpainting after capture, re-compression or a swapped file: red, because the hash no longer matches the signature.
  • A proof forged with the attacker’s own key and a genuine timestamp: yellow, never green, because the key is not enrolled.
  • Backdating the capture time: yellow, because the timestamp is more than 60 minutes after the recorded capture time.
  • Swapping or stripping the timestamp, or editing the proof: red.
  • Staged damage or another vehicle photographed with a real camera: not detected. A genuine capture of a false scene verifies.
  • Photographing an image shown on a screen: not judged. The apps record screen checks as hints; the SDK does not use them.

4. Relationship to CPP and the VeraSnap apps

The SDK ports the verification logic of the VeraSnap iOS app 1.6 and the 1.6.1 rules: signer-key origin, capture-time consistency, and a timestamp time taken only from a verified token. It reproduces the apps’ formats, not draft-vso-cpp-core; for example, the Merkle tree uses the apps’ construction without leaf and node domain separation.

Attestation data written inside a proof is reported as stated, not verified. Per-capture App Attest and Play Integrity checks belong to the CPP v1.7 Capture Environment Attestation draft and are not implemented. Deliberate differences from the apps — for example, an unknown signing key is yellow unless the receiving organisation enrolled it — are listed in the limitations document.

5. Testing and its limits

125 tests run in first-party CI on Python 3.10, 3.12 and 3.13. They cover 31 fraud scenarios with RFC 3161 tokens from public timestamp authorities, Android attestation chains from Google’s published samples, synthetic App Attest objects, canonicalisation and Merkle cases. One scenario was cross-checked with OpenSSL. The canonicalisation reproduces EventHash values from fixtures in the VeraSnap iOS test suite.

Not yet done: verification of proofs exported from devices running the current apps, a parity run against the apps’ own scenario tests, independent reproduction, and a security audit.

6. Capture SDK

A capture SDK for insurers’ own apps (iOS Swift Package and Android AAR) is at the design stage, and its design is published in the repository. It is not open source and is not part of this release.

Disclosure

VeritasChain Co., Ltd. develops VeraSnap and this SDK, and it also operates VSO, which publishes CPP. This notice reports a release; it is not a recommendation of the product. See the VSO neutrality and non-endorsement statement.